

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01     DACCA 03533 01 OF 02 030405Z  
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 EB-08 OMB-01 AGRE-00 IO-13  
OES-07 COME-00 HA-05 TRSE-00 /126 W  
-----063734 030421Z /11

P R 011033Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9598  
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY RANGOON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 DACCA 3533

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR BG US UR AF BM  
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY

1. ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 1 (AFTER DINNER) AND THE MORNING  
OF JUNE 3 (IN HIS OFFICE) I HAD LONG TALKS WITH FOREIGN  
SECRETARY TABARAK HUSAIN ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS, SOME  
OF WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE DEPARTMENT.

2. FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF BANGLADESH. WHEN I HAD FIRST  
ARRIVED IN DACCA, HUSAIN HAD URGED ME TO GET OUT AND SEE  
THE COUNTRY AND FORM MY OWN IMPRESSIONS; HE HAD IMPLIED  
THAT SOME OF MY STAFF WERE A BIT NEGATIVE (I DIFFERED).  
WHEN I VISITED HIS OFFICE TODAY I TOLD HIM I HAD FOLLOWED  
HIS ADVICE AND SEEN SOME OF THE COUNTRY FOR MYSELF AND  
ALSO SOUGHT THE COUNSEL OF MY EXCEEDINGLY COMPETENT STAFF.  
I HAD FOUND TWO THINGS. FIRST, THE OBSTACLES, BOTH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02     DACCA 03533 01 OF 02 030405Z

NATURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL, TO DEVELOPMENT WERE IMMENSE  
AND FRUSTRATION OFTEN RESULTED. IF AMERICANS FOCUSED  
ON THE OBSTACLES IT WAS BECAUSE THAT WAS WHERE THE  
EFFORT WAS REQUIRED AND I SYMPATHIZED WITH THEM ENTIRELY.  
SECOND, I REPORTED THAT DESPITE THE OBSTACLES I HAD  
FOUND ACHIEVEMENTS -- PERHAPS SMALL WHEN COMPARED TO THE  
PROBLEMS, BUT NONETHELESS SIGNIFICANT: THE EXPANSION OF

WHEAT CULTIVATION, THE SUCCESSFUL PROCUREMENT EFFORT, THE INCREASED USE OF FERTILIZER. THESE MADE ME, IF NOT OPTIMISTIC, AT LEAST HOPEFUL THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AND THAT GOVERNMENT, DESPITE ITS DIFFICULTIES, COULD ORGANIZE PROPERLY-SELECTED PROGRAMS TO CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS. I TOLD HUSAIN, AS I HAVE TOLD MOST OTHER BDG OFFICIALS WITH WHOM I HAVE MET, THAT THE USG COULD NOT FOR LONG CONTINUE TO MEET WORLD FOOD DEFICITS AND THAT BANGLADESH HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT AND CONTROL POPULATION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURE BUT I WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT FAMILY PLANNING AS RESENT ACTIVITY BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT PROGRAMS HAD BEEN INADEQUATE. HUSAIN URGED ME TO RAISE THESE ISSUES WITH PRESIDENT ZIA, IF HE IS RE-ELECTED, AND I SAID THAT I INTENDED TO DO SO. I THEN REVIEWED PROGRAMS WE HAVE UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE BDG -- E.G. TITLE III PL-480 AND FERTILIZER -- AND SAID THAT I BELIEVED THESE WERE GOOD PROGRAMS AND MET THE NEEDS OF BANGLADESH. HUSAIN AGREED.

3. BANGLADESH-SOVIET RELATIONS. HUSAIN SPOKE BRIEFLY OF HIS VISIT APRIL 25-28 TO MOSCOW. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, HAD TREATED HIM WITH GREAT CORDIALITY AND HE HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY THIS. HE WAS ALSO IMPRESSED BY THEIR CANDOR. THEY GAVE HIM A THOROUGH AND FRANK BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND THEIR TROUBLES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03     DACCA 03533 01 OF 02 030405Z

WITH THE CHINESE. THEY UPBRAIDED HIM FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO CERTAIN BILATERAL ISSUES. WHY, THEY ASKED, DID BANGLADESH FAIL TO UTILIZE SOVIET AID? WHY DID THE BDG LEAVE UNUSED SOME OF THE SCHOLARSHIPS PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET UNION? WHY DID THE BDG KEEP ASKING THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THEIR EMBASSY? HUSAIN DID NOT INDICATE WHAT REPLIES HE GAVE BUT, JUDGING FROM THE SUSPICIONS HERE OF THE SOVIETS, I DOUBT THAT HE GAVE THEM MUCH SATISFACTION. HUSAIN SAID HE HOPED THE USG WOULD SPEAK WITH EQUAL CANDOR. I TOLD HIM I INTENDED TO.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01     DACCA 03533 02 OF 02 030413Z

ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05

H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02

SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 EB-08 OMB-01 AGRE-00 IO-13

OES-07 COME-00 HA-05 TRSE-00 /126 W

-----063777 030420Z /11

P R 021033Z JUN 78

FM AMEMBASSY DACCA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9599

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 DACCA 3533

4. AFGHANISTAN. AFTER HIS COMMENTS ON HIS MOSCOW VISIT, I BRIEFED HUSAIN REGARDING OUR RECENT REACTIONS TO SOVIET AND CUBA ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. I SAID THAT IN REGARD TO AFGHANISTAN WE WERE RESERVING JUDGMENT REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TRULY INDEPENDENT. HUSAIN, SHOWING MODERATE -- BUT ONLY MODERATE -- CONCERN ABOUT CHANGES IN AFGHANISTAN, SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD REMAIN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED AND THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS IRAN AND PAKISTAN. HE REMARKED THAT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN COULD HAVE SERIOUS EFFECT ON PAKISTAN AND ANYTHING EFFECTING PAKISTAN COULD AFFECT THE ENTIRE SUBCONTINENT. THEREFORE BANGLADESH WAS CONCERNED. WHILE AT ONE TIME AGREEING THAT IT WAS SENSIBLE TO RESERVE JUDGMENT ABOUT THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, HE LATER MORE EMPHATICALLY QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WAS STILL A SENSIBLE COURSE. IN VIEW OF THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DACCA 03533 02 OF 02 030413Z

TO MOSCOW, AND AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN REACHED SINCE THE COUP, COULD CONCLUSIONS NOT ALREADY BE REACHED? HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE OBVIOUSLY LYING VERY LOW IN AFGHANISTAN, A STRATEGY HE CONSIDERED WAS DESIGNED TO CONCEAL THEIR ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT THERE.

5. BURMESE REFUGEES. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SPOKE OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH LAY AHEAD FOR HIM DURING HIS NEGOTIATING MISSION TO RANGOON. HE SPOKE OF THE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WHICH HAVE CAUSED THE REFUGEE MOVEMENT AND URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES SPEAK FRANKLY TO THE BURMESE ABOUT

THE SITUATION. WHEN I MENTIONED OUR LACK OF INFLUENCE IN RANGOON AND THAT COUNTRY'S DELIBERATE ISOLATION, HE REPLIED THAT ISOLATION WAS ACCEPTABLE ONLY SO LONG AS INTERNAL POLICIES DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT NEIGHBORS; AND THIS WAS NO LONGER SO. I BRIEFED THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ON AMBASSADOR SIDDIQI'S CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS, ABOUT WHICH HUSAIN OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT YET HAD A REPORT.

6. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY THEN RESTATED A REQUEST HE HAD MADE TO ME SOME DAYS AGO FOR MY ASSESSMENT OF WHAT LAY BEHIND THE REFUGEE MOVEMENT. I REPLIED THAT OUR INFORMATION WAS QUITE LIMITED. THOSE REPORTS WHICH WH HAD INDICATED THAT THE DECISION TO CHECK UP ON THE CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE OF THE ARAKANESE MUSLIMS HAD BEEN MADE AT A HIGH LEVEL IN THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT. WE HAD NO REPEAT NO REPORTS OF INVOLVEMENT OF "OTHER NATIONS". THE MIGRATION HAD APPARENTLY BEEN STIMULATED BY THE EXAMINATION OF CERTIFICATES AND THE FEAR OF MUSLIMS THAT THEY WOULD BE ARRESTED IF THEY WERE FOUND WITHOUT PROPER CREDENTIALS. I SAID THAT WHILE WE HAD HEARD OF ONE ACCOUNT OF VIOLENCE WHEN THE INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN RESISTED, WE DID NOT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03     DACCA 03533 02 OF 02 030413Z

HAVE REPORTS WHICH CONFIRMED EXTENSIVE BEATING, RAPING AND ABDUCTIONS. I EXPRESSED MY VIEW THAT IT WAS AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO AGREE TO STOP THE FLOW OF NEW REFUGEES AS TO REPATRIATE THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY CROSSED THE BORDER. HUSAIN SAW THE REDUCTION IN THE DAILY FLOW OF REFUGEES AS A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF BURMESE RECOGNITION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. FINALLY I REVIEWED WITH HUSAIN THE STATUS OF U.S. CONSIDERATION OF REFUGEE RELIEF, ASSURING HIM THAT IT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY. HE URGED SPEED SO THAT NEEDS COULD BE MET.

7. COMMENT: I HAD FELT IT IMPORTANT THAT I ESTABLISH DURING MY EARLY DAYS HERE THAT I AM SYMPATHETICALLY INTERESTED IN HELPING BANGLADESHI DEVELOPMENT, BUT THAT I WILL INSIST ON PROPER USE OF AID. HUSAIN'S CHANGE OF ATTITUDE SINCE MY EARLY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM SUGGESTS THAT I MAY HAVE GOTTEN THE FIRST POINT ACROSS; THE LATTER MAY REQUIRE SOMETHING MORE THAN WORDS. I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT I GIVE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BURMESE REFUGEE SITUATION WHICH ADDED REALITY TO THE BANGLADESHI VIEW. HUSAIN'S RESTRAINED COMMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN MAY HAVE CONCEALED STRONGER VIEWS; I HAVE HEARD HIM ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS IMPLY THAT THE CHANGES IN AFGHANISTAN WERE A RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM CONFRONTING SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IN AFRICA AND ASIA.

SCHNEIDER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MEETING REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 jun 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978DACCA03533  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780232-0541  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** DACCA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t197806108/aaaadpfr.tel  
**Line Count:** 225  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** daa6c97d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 may 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2166312  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY  
**TAGS:** PEPR, BG, US, UR, AF, BM, (HUSAIN, TABARAK)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/daa6c97d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014